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Abstract. 30 years of rapid economic development in China has brought about prosperity as well as enlarged 
disparity, among which is the dramatic cleavage between rural and urban, a challenge that many developing 
countries have to face. In order to achieve a more balanced and integrated development between rural an ur-
ban, since late 2008, the Chengdu Municipality has allocated budget for village level public services projects, 
and entitle local villagers the right to decide, monitor evaluate the projects. 
Local villagers’ participation usually goes through 3 steps to choose their own village public services proj-
ects, that is, project proposals collecting, decision making, monitoring and evaluating. Village Council, 
Democratic Finance Management Group, and Democratic Monitoring Group composed of elected villagers 
are set up to make decision and supervise. This participatory budgeting program covers more than 2,700 vil-
lages, 6 million villagers; total annual budget is over 170 million USD, and still expanding and increasing. 
This local pilot participatory budgeting and local democracy reform in China is signiicant, in the sense that 
it is exploring improving rural public services, illing rural-urban gap by means of direct villager participation 
in village-level public service budgets decision making, monitoring and evaluation, brings transparency and 
revitalizes rural community solidarity, though there are still many setbacks and challenges to face. This pilot 
reform has enriched international participatory budgeting practices, the loan innovation linked short-term and 
medium-term development with participatory budgeting.
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1. Methodology
The article is a brief case study based on research on 
villager direct participation on rural village public 
service budgets in Chengdu, China, for the past 5 
years. The author and research team had dozens of 
interviews with local villagers, village cadres, local 
government oficials, observation on villager council 
meeting and the process of how public services bud-
gets were allocated. Besides interviews and 
observations, we have collected and reviewed more 
than a dozen village documents and records on PB 
projects decision making, monitoring and evalua-
tion. Local Communist Party and government policy 
documents are also important sources of our data. 
And for the past 2 year, we’ve been collecting de-
tailed village PB projects data, now we have more 
than 30,000 records gathered in more than 2,000 vil-
lages in Chengdu. All the facts are based on these 
data the author has collected, and opinions relected 
disusing with researchers, oficials.
2. Background
30 years of rapid economic development in China 
since the opening-up reform has brought about pros-
perity as well as enlarged disparity, especially the 
gap between rural and urban areas. To narrow the gap 
and inally address the development imbalance is a 
common challenge facing many developing coun-
tries. In order to achieve a more balanced and inte-
grated development between rural an urban areas, in 
2007, Chinese central government designated 
Chengdu Municipality as a pilot zone to explore a 
balanced and integrated rural-urban development. 
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Chengdu is the capital city of Sichuan Province, still large-
ly rural in central Chinese Mainland. It is located approxi-
mately 2,000 km from Beijing and 2,300 km from Shanghai 
and is often considered as the gateway to Tibet. At the same 
time, Chengdu is one of the fastest growing cities in China in 
terms of both demography and economy. According to the 
sixth national population census, Chengdu had a population 
of slightly over 14 million in 2010. Including those who are 
not oficially registered as permanent households or 
temporary residents, the total population is between 15 and 
18 million. 
China has four tiers of formal administration under the cen-
tral government. The irst level is oficially made up of 34 
provincial-level governments, in this paper Sichuan Province. 
The second level of administration includes more than 300 
prefectural-level administrative units, including prefectures 
and prefectural-level cities, in this paper Chengdu. The third 
level of administration is districts in urban downtown, coun-
ties county-level cities in rural area, there are 20 of such in 
Chengdu, 6 of which are considered as urban districts, while 
the rest are rural districts. What is called Chengdu would be 
considered in western Standard as a Metropolitan Area or a 
City Region and covers an area of 12,390 sq km with some 
remote villages more than 100 kilometers away from the 
downtown
The lowest tier of oficial administration is townships, 
towns in rural and sub-districts in urban. Below the formal 
bureaucratic administration tier are communities in urban 
and villages in rural, they are autonomous, local people elect 
their community or village committee for part of their public 
affair administration, but only in rural villages there is direct 
election for all adult villagers according to the laws. There 
are more than 2300 villages in Chengdu with a population 
varying around 1,000-5,000.
Within the framework of Chengdu municipal government 
pilot reform policy on integrated and balanced rural-urban 
development, one of the fundamental approaches is to invest 
heavily in rural infrastructure and rural public services. The 
most majority of rural investment is planned and implemented 
through local authorities. However, out of the 59 rural public 
services classiied by local government, 8 would be delivered 
by local villages and local villages are required and encour-
aged to participate directly in their local public decisions and 
services. 1
Since late 2008, Chengdu Municipality allocates a signii-
cant budget for improvement of village-level public services, 
called “Village Level Public Services and Social 
Administration Funding”,  Hereafter named Chengdu 
Participatory Budgeting (PB). The budgets has covered 
nearly 40,000 projects decided by local people and imple-
mented over the 2009 -2012 period in over 2300 villages and 
rural communities in Chengdu.
PB in China dates back to 2004 in Xinhe town in the city of 
Wenling in Zhejiang Province. Through deliberative discus-
sion, the town incorporated public participation into the 
People’s Congress framework, establishing PB that inlu-
enced the inner mechanisms of the budgetary decision-mak-
ing process. This created a precedent for engaging the grass-
roots in a public debate on the use of the public budget.2
Following this, PB experiments were carried out in various 
places in China and were a powerful demonstration of public 
budget reform and democratization processes in local gov-
ernments. A range of PB initiatives were set up across China, 
including in Jiaozuo, Harbin and Wuxi (2005), Minhang and 
Shanghai (2007), Chengdu (2009) and Baimiao township in 
Sichuan Province (2010).3
Deepening local democracy is one of the features of pilot 
balanced rural-urban development experiments in Chengdu. 
Judging by oficial documents reviewed, it seems policy 
designers believe local democracy is accompanied with 
privatization and capitalization. Rural democracy reform is 
irmly imbedded into other reform measures in rural 
development, such as rural land ownership, collective village 
assets, village farming cooperatives, land leasing and scale 
farming, of all have to face collective decision making 
challenges brought along with privatization and capitalization. 
Take land leasing and scale farming for example, once 
landownership clariication reform is completed, as each 
rural household has very little pieces of land, it is a most 
eficient and cost least way for a farming cooperative/
company to lease the land collectively with villagers’ council 
on behalf of all the villagers respectively. Among these 
reform measures, rural capital and productive capacity is the 
destination, and Chengdu PB is designed as an important 
democracy reform measure.
3. Origination of the PB and local democracy 
practices 
The Chengdu PB and local democracy reform is a local in-
novation originated in rural land property rights reform. The 
pilot reform of rural property rights held in Chengdu was an-
other major structural reform following the household con-
tract responsibility system in rural areas since the three de-
cades of reform and opening up. 
Chengdu had an innovative reform on rural land ownership. 
The reform aims at conirming and veriication for each rural 
household, the land property rights of homestead land, arable 
land and forest land. Then farmers could voluntarily transfer 
part of their homestead and arable land property to acquire 
land property beneits in the market.
The property right reform is to endow farmers the land 
right, and thus make it convenient to transfer the land into 
capital. In March 2008, Heming village in Chengdu conduct-
ed an experiment to award the land rights to villagers. The 
ambiguity and uncertainty of land property rights was a result 
of successive land reforms, land requisitions and redrawing 
the land boundaries for several times in Chinese history and 
had existed for several decades. This makes it extremely 
complicated to redeine the land boundaries. Yet the land 
property right is the major concern of the villagers for their 
economic interest lies in it and therefore, must be handled 
with extra care. The interest conlicts among villagers, be-
tween villagers and the collective, and between villagers and 
the government render the redeining work even more difi-
cult to continue. The land ownership reform stagnated while 
disputes and conlicts lasted, and local government oficials 
were facing enormous pressures to carry the reform through. 
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In order to push forward the reform of land property rights, 
Heming Village established a village convocation hosted by 
several elderly people of prestige in the village to help to re-
deine the property rights and regulate the existing disputes. 
When local oficials found this approach effective in solving 
local conlicts, they duplicated it widely to other villages still 
stucked in land boundaries redeinition. Very soon, this 
village council consisting of respective villagers became an 
eficient tool both acknowledged by local oficials and 
villagers in solving conlicts.
Shortly after land ownership reform, was the rural public 
service improvement reform. To avoid similar setbacks 
during the early phase of land ownership, and also because of 
the policy design that 8 categories of public services should 
be mainly delivered among and by local villages, with policy 
support from Municipal government, the practice in Heming 
Village and experiences borrowed from other regions of 
China has been spread in all the villages of Chengdu. The 
village convocation consisting of respected elders developed 
into a village council consisting of elected villagers; within 
the village council, there are democratic supervision group, 
democratic inance group established for villagers to super-
vise, make resolution and appraisal of the spending of village 
public service funds.
Since 2008, the Chengdu municipal government has issued 
a series of policies and regulations to establish and formalize 
a new pattern of village-level governance mechanism.
These policies include:
1. Establishing a village council as a permanent deci-
sion-making body to deal with self-governing af-
fairs, to exercise right to making decisions and 
supervising village affairs within scope of authori-
ty entrusted by villagers (representatives) meeting. 
Members of village sub-council are directly elected 
by and among local villagers.
2. Adjusting and standardizing functions of village 
committee. In the new pattern of village gover-
nance mechanism, duties of village committee has 
been standardized and limited. Its irst duty is to be 
responsible for villagers assembly, report the work, 
execute the decisions of villager council; second, to 
undertake the social management and public ser-
vices commissioned and inanced by the govern-
ment; third, to carry out public welfare, mediate 
disputes, help maintain the social security and oth-
er autonomous affairs of the village.
3. Optimize supply of village-level public products. 
Since 2008, each village community has received 
at least ￥200,000 from the government to cover 
expenditures for village public services, and spe-
ciic uses will be discussed and decided by village 
council.
4. Strengthen leadership of village Party branch over 
village council. Village party secretary also acts as 
convener of village council, and host of village 
council meetings. Village Party branch is respon-
sible for receiving and reviewing agendas proposed 
by village council and sub-councils to ensure that 
all agendas are in framework of self-governance 
and related laws and policies, and to judge if all 
agendas are genuine intentions of proposers. As for 
major issues touching upon long-term develop-
ment of village and common concerns of villagers, 
the Party branch will hold party meetings to discuss 
and offer recommendations before putting forward 
these issues at village council meeting. This is an 
important fact in the Chinese political contexts to 
discuss, whether and how the overwhelming 
Communist Party power will facilitate or undermine 
local democracy.
According to related polices and regulations announced by 
Chengdu Communist Party Committee and Municipality, 
feasible PB projects fall into four major categories that cover 
a wide range of options, which can be decided by villagers:
• Education and recreation facilities: such as village 
radio and cable TV, village library, entertainment 
and itness arenas. 
• Basic services & infrastructure for local economic 
development, including building and improvement 
of village roads, water drainage system, gardening, 
irrigation and water supply. 
• Agricultural training, such as farming and business 
training for local villagers.
• Village and community social welfare, which in-
cludes, security patrol, sanitation, solid waste col-
lection. 
Among the 2,300 rural villages and communities, each vil-
lage could get annually 200,000RMB (32,000USD) minimum 
for PB projects, and the amount is increasing each year. By 
2012, the minimum amount for each village is more than 
50,000USD and could be as much as 85,000USD. Over the 3 
PB cycles during 2009 -2011 period, the total value of proj-
ects funded by PB process was approximately 365.5 million 
USD and is gradually increasing from year to year. And that 
means the amount for per villager / year is around 22 USD, a 
quite high igure when compared with renowned PB cities.4 
During the project years 2009-2011, of all total amount of 
the four categories, basic services & infrastructure is the most 
heavily prioritized by local villagers, 67% of the total budget, 
44% in terms of projects numbers; social welfare is the sec-
ond largest, 27% of the total budget, 41% in terms of projects 
numbers; the rest budget for training, education, recreation is 
just around 5% in terms of amounts. The more remote, the 
more villages show tendency towards infrastructure projects, 
mostly projects like village roads pavement and irrigation 
system. 
4. How does the Chengdu PB work
4.1 PB Cycles in Chengdu
In Chengdu PB practices, each village establishes a village 
Council, usually consisting of a couple of dozen members 
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elected by and among local villagers. Since its launching, PB 
has become the most important duty (or responsibility) of 
Village Councils. In addition, a speciic Budget Oversight 
Group consisting of 5 to 7 elected local villagers will monitor 
and oversight implementation of PB budget. This is an inno-
vation within the Chinese budgetary system that increases 
capacity of villagers to control spending of the funds and col-
lective income. 
Chengdu PB cycles are not strictly identical from one lo-
cality to the other. Basically, villagers go through a three 
steps cycle in order to identify, select and implement their 
public services projects, 
The irst step of Chengdu PB is to gather information 
among all village households as to what projects are needed. 
Usually, a questionnaire will be handed out to each household 
to solicit suggestions for what projects villagers would like to 
have this year. At the beginning of the PB projects opinions 
survey, the questionnaire is usually open, villagers could ill 
in any suggestions on how to allocate village PB funds; as the 
project proposals later became predictable and routine, some 
questionnaire are prepared with closed options to choose with 
some spaces for additional open proposals. The PB projects 
proposal gathering is usually done by village committee, with 
the assistance of village council members. Then these pro-
posed projects are categorized and scrutinized, similar 
proposals will be categorized as one proposal, some proposals 
like “share the funds in cash evenly for every household”, as 
well as other proposals fall out of the 4 categories of village 
level public services will be eliminated out of the potential 
projects. Another round of proposals gathering is conducted 
if necessary when there is not enough feasible proposals to be 
voted. 
The second step is decision making at Village Council lev-
el (which is composed of elected villagers) who votes for the 
projects that will be implemented this year, and the contractor 
who bid for the project will also be chosen. A list of the 
possible projects generated in the irst step will be debated 
and voted. This is the phrase that heated debate and negotiation 
happened most, as villager representatives are usually elected 
among their own village group constituency, the representa-
tives usually have the pressure to win a vote for projects that 
will most beneit their own village group, like a village 
cement road paved into their village group lands, or an 
irrigation channel maintenance close to their ields. 
Sometimes a prioritize score will be applied to assist the ne-
gation procedure, all potential projects will be given a certain 
marks prioritize by each representative from most important 
to not important, those projects win highest scores will be 
chosen for implementation.
Once a compromise has been reached among village 
council representatives, the projects are reported by the 
Village Councils to their respective Township Government 
(next administrative and Political tier) where they are techni-
cally scrutinized to make sure all these chosen options fall 
into law and policy regulations, then eventually ratiied. 
Budget information and budget process is made public 
through posters, lyers, slogan banners, village public infor-
mation board and meetings. Villagers may call “local ex-
perts” to help them assess and evaluate PB proposals. For 
instance, a local construction worker might become a “local 
expert” to examine a village road proposal. 
The third step is monitoring and evaluation. Within village 
council there is a Democratic Finance Management Group 
and Budget Oversight Group composed of elected villagers, 
together with the Village Council review and monitor PB 
projects. Once they are completed, the same groups will con-
duct an evaluation. PB results are usually disseminated 
through village public information board. If the project 
passed evaluation and assessment, project funding, or rest of 
the project funding will be transferred to the contractor as 
agreed when the contractors bid for the project. 
In some of local villages, they had interesting innovation to 
ensure fair evaluation of PB projects. As PB project money is 
reserved in village bank account and administrated directed 
at township level, without an oficially stamped documents 
issued by village council, the money would not be transferred 
to anyone. In Mayan village, they cut the oficial approval 
stamp into ive pieces, each 5 important representative keeps 
one piece, only when all of the ive representatives are 
convinced that the project are qualiied after evaluation, 
could a whole stamp put together and valid to accredit oficial 
document that will be submitted to township government for 
money transferring.
In some cases this PB cycle can be more complex, the 
3-steps cycle varies into 6-steps, 8-steps cycle in different 
district in Chengdu. For example, a 8-steps cycle usually 
includes, mobilizing maximum involvement of community 
members; collecting opinions, village council representatives 
visit every household to collect their opinions; summary and 
categorize proposed projects by village council; deliberation 
and vote by all village council members; preliminary approv-
al by township government– the administrative level above 
villages − and once approved, a inal vote at village council 
level; township inal approval; drafting of guidelines by 
village council for contracts and handing over to supervising 
group; and project evaluation by all committees and villager 
representatives. 
5. Implication, Signiicance and Innovation
5.1 Responding directly to local needs 
Unlike other rural investment in China, public services 
budget is not allocated through each level of government tiers 
and through many different bureaus, the budgets is directly 
entitled to villages, villagers are required and encouraged to 
participate directly in local public money decision making, 
monitoring and evaluation. It has made rural public services 
more eficiently respond to varies local village demands. 
5.2 Transparency
Directly entitling budgets to villages is a way to make rural 
public investment much more transparent both in and above 
village level. Traditionally how much public investment a 
village could get depends on how capable village cadres 
could raise funds from upper level government and bureaus; 
this usually means rent-seeking opportunities among many 
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bureaucratic oficials and inside the village.
5.3 Revitalize rural community solidarity
A traditional Chinese village is based on self-government and 
traditional customs. Squires, clans and religions combined 
villagers as a whole. Until the 1990s, most public services 
such as primary school education, seniors support, and infra-
structures for farming in rural areas were provided collec-
tively. Yet with decades’ of reforms and adjustment of rural 
policies, rural communities have gradually disintegrated, and 
the old-fashioned social relations to some extent undermined. 
Since the household contract responsibility system reform, 
farm plots have been allocated to each family, and village 
collective economic base has broken down. Traditional social 
base is damaged as central government increases direct in-
vestment in rural medical services, education, providing for 
aged, infrastructures of farming, and rural taxes abolishment. 
With the process of urbanization, many young farmers rash 
into large cities for employment and income increase, this 
makes the rural communities even more desolate. 
In this sense, even more important, Chengdu PB appears as 
a powerful modernization instrument of Chinese rural com-
munes inherited from the revolution. At the same time it 
seems a way to build a new balance between individual rights 
and collective cohesion and tradition, in front of a sweeping 
and exclusionary privatization. PB channels signiicant - 
even if largely insuficient - resources towards the village 
“commons” and increases their value as commons and indi-
visible social and economic spaces. PB funds actually helped 
to strengthen local people’s common social and economic 
interests. Besides village public services and infrastructures, 
it’s an investment on local solidarity, and a foster on rural 
local democracy evolution in the context of rapid social 
change in rural China.
5.4 Loan innovation linking short and medium term 
development
Another major innovation is that villagers can either select 
projects or use part or the totality of the PB resources to se-
cure a medium term loan. Lets take a village of 2500 inhabit-
ants that received 50 000 USD in 2012 for their PB process. 
Villagers can either chose to select projects up to this value or 
decide to use a portion or the total amount as an entry for 
obtaining a loan from Chengdu Small Town Investment 
Company, a Public Investment Fund. The maximum amount 
they can obtain is seven times the entry, therefore 350 000 
USD if villagers choose to get a loan on the 50 000 resources. 
If they choose to fund projects for a value of 40 000 and save 
the rest 10 000 USD fund for the loan, they can get a loan of 
70 000 USD. These loans are payable over 8 years, and will 
be reimbursed with the resources that they will receive over 
the next 8 years. In other words, if a village decides to use its 
50 000 USD just for a loan of 350 000, there will not be any 
PB process during the next 8 years. 
Usually remote and poor villages tend to commit their re-
sources to apply for large loans for infrastructure such as 
roads, which is the most intended projects by villagers. Some 
play on both sides: annual projects with part of the resources, 
and 8 years loan for a heavy investment such as roads or a 
major irrigation system on the other. 
These values are quite signiicant not only for a Chinese 
village, but for any village in most parts of the world. If well 
deined, well debated, as it is expected with the new gover-
nance model designed in Chengdu, such projects can certain-
ly bring signiicant local changes. As they are basically pub-
lic works, they can at the same time generate work and 
income for villagers.
However, the central innovation with this mechanism is 
that Chengdu has found quite a unique way to link short term 
and longer term planning, without loosing people’s participa-
tion. They are de facto bringing a real innovation to PB, and 
probably one of the major ones in the last 15 years. They give 
an answer to the frequent critique towards PB as a short term, 
immediate mechanism that has a weak capacity to bridge 
with long term or strategic planning. This is one more reason 
to analyse carefully what is happening on Chengdu villages 
and what is the impact on local development.
6. Setbacks and Challenges
6.1 Representative participation and social-political 
context 
Like all other local democracy reform in China, the 
Communist Party will have to be insisted as a leading power 
whatsoever. As mentioned above, one of the local democracy 
reform principles is to strengthen leadership of village Party 
branch to the village council. Generally there are two 
governance institutions in Chinese rural villages, Party 
branch and village committee. According to the election law 
in China, Village committee members are elected among and 
by local villagers. However, elections, like other liberal insti-
tutions in an illiberal polity, part of a strategy designed to 
help one-party rule endure. Later, they may be legitimating 
the current regime rather than serving as a harbinger of sys-
temic change.5 
In China, the quality of democracy in much of the country-
side remains stubbornly low, mainly because village commit-
tees, once an election is over, are situated in a socio-political 
environment that has changed surprisingly little.6 In case of 
the reform in Chengdu, a second representative institution, 
village council, is thus designed as elected among and by 
local villagers, to replace some democracy functions that fail 
with village committee. Unfortunately, though at the very be-
ginning of the reform, possible drawbacks had been 
anticipated, and roles of village committee had been clearly 
deined, regulated, However, what has been observed for the 
past years is that, though at the early practices of village 
council operation, it is a decent channel for democracy 
powers, but some, or most, villager councils later retrograde 
into the same destiny as village committee.  Legitimacy of 
village council is inevitably ruined when a village council 
meeting/voting has to be convened by village Party branch; 
when project proposal gathering is illed out by village cadres 
without consulting; when detailed project information is not 
properly announced publicly; when local elite forms up their 
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alliances with representatives and captures villagers power 
away; etc..
6.2 Social & Policy Exclusion
Social inclusion remains one of the challenges, no serious 
attention has been given to disadvantaged people, primarily 
women, children and the elderly. The most frequently select-
ed projects are productive infrastructure for increasing in-
come opportunities. Few of them are speciically for women, 
children, or the handicapped, except for some recreational 
and social schemes, which are actually beneiting all 
villagers. 
Further more, only native villagers are entitled to the 
funding, have the right to vote. Non-native migrants are 
excluded from the PB funding. There are as the city expands, 
part of the villages’ land that was classiied as rural is ac-
quired by government and real estate developers for urban 
expansion. However, villagers remain “rural” (as rural com-
munities) and entitled to rural public service funding. In the 
township or the rural communities, there are still a huge num-
ber of migrants who are not registered as local residents, they 
are not entitled to local public services, not the right to the 
village level public services funding. 
By 2013, annual PB budget for each village has increase to 
30,000-50,000RMB (50,000-84,000USD), The coverage of 
PB has increased to more than 2,700 villages/communities, 
around 6 million citizens participation or even more all across 
Chengdu, more than 170 million USD total annual budget 
and still increasing, the Chengdu PB might be by far the larg-
est Chinese PB in terms of scale and spread, it is important 
for exploring how local democracy could help narrowing ur-
ban-rural gap, and satisfying local people demands. 
By end of 2013, some urban communities has also been 
entitled to such PB funds. The expansion of PB funds into 
urban communities make the practices even more compli-
cated, as urban communities autonomy in China is quite 
different from that of rural villages. Furthermore, local policy 
designer have been trying to upgrade the local democracy to 
township levels in Chengdu.
The participatory budgeting practices in Chengdu is still at 
its early stages, many setbacks and challenges are still to be 
meet, and it offers an interesting opportunity to understand 
and compare how citizen participation could work in different 
social and political contexts. Now the pilot local democracy 
reform in Chengdu is still lest known, there is a lot of barren 
land for researchers and practioners to study and experiment.
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